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Abstract 
A game in strategic form is strict dominance solvable if iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies yields a 
unique strategy profile (strict dominance solution). Textbook presentations of this material are framed in the context of 
finite games and it is argued that if a strict dominance solution exists, it must also be the unique Nash equilibrium. We 
construct a simple counter example demonstrating that strict dominance solutions need not constitute Nash equilibria in 
infinite games, even if each player has a unique undominated strategy. This conclusion has special pedagogical 
significance as the sensitivity of results to the finite game context can often be lost on those being introduced to the 
material for the first time. As an additional pedagogical exercise, we establish that the traditional textbook conclusion 
extends to settings in which strategy spaces are compact and utility functions are continuous.
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A standard feature of game theory textbooks, especially those pitched at the graduate level, is
a presentation on the iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies and the implications
this process has on rational play.  This general discussion begins by noting that rational players
can be thought of as being precluded from selecting strictly dominated strategies.  This insight is
extended when player objectives are assumed to be common knowledge as attention can thus be
focused on the residual game in which strictly dominated strategies have been eliminated from
each player’s strategy set.  A game is said to be dominance solvable when the iterative
application of this logic to the resultant residual games yields a unique strategy profile.
Following the logic outlined above, this “strict dominance solution,” when it exists, is argued to
be the only outcome that can be pursued by players who are commonly known to be rational.
Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995), page 239, provides a representative quote.  “As a
general matter, if we are willing to assume that all players are rational and that this fact and the
players’ payoffs are common knowledge (so everybody knows that everybody knows that…
everybody is rational), then we do not need to stop after only two iterations.  We can eliminate
not only strictly dominated strategies and strategies that are strictly dominated after the first
deletion of strategies but also strategies that are strictly dominated after this next deletion of
strategies, and so on.”  The standard presentation of iterative strict dominance goes on to
conclude that the strict dominance solution is endowed with singular equilibrium features.  For
instance, Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), page 46, states that, “… this profile is necessarily a Nash
equilibrium (indeed, it is the unique Nash equilibrium).”  Similar discussions appear in the texts
of Gibbons (1992), Moulin (1986), Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), and Vega-Redondo (2003).
These discussions are, however, framed either implicitly or explicitly in the context of finite
games.  We present a straightforward counter example that can be used to highlight the
significance that the finite game context has in the fore mentioned conclusion.  This example
further demonstrates that when there are infinitely many strategies, even if every player has a
unique undominated strategy (and thus an iterative appeal to the common knowledge of
rationality is unnecessary), this strategy profile need not constitute a Nash equilibrium.  As an
additional pedagogical exercise, we generalize the standard finite game conclusion and show that
if all strategy sets are compact and all utility functions are continuous, strict dominance solutions
will necessarily constitute Nash equilibria.
2. Strict Dominance Solvability and a Counter-Example
We begin by formally defining the notion of dominance solvability.  Take as given a game in
strategic form G={I, (Si)i∈I , (ui)i∈I}.  That is, I denotes the finite set of players, Si´ denotes the
pure strategy space (which may be infinite) of player j∈I, and uj: (Si)i∈I→ denotes the utility
function of player j∈I.  So as to avoid the technical details that ensue when defining mixed
strategies of infinite strategy spaces, we define the notion of strict domination solely in terms of
pure strategies.  As we argue below, this expository simplification in no way compromises our
conclusions.  Readers interested in a textbook presentation of mixed strategies in the context of
infinite strategy spaces may consult Myerson (1994), section 3.13.2
Definition 2.1 Suppose Sj´ ⊆ Sj for each j∈I.  The strategy si∈Si´ is strictly dominated for player i
given (Sj´)j∈I if there exists si´∈ Si´ such that ui(si´,s-i)>ui(si,s-i) for all s-i∈S-i´=(Sj´)j≠i.
Definition 2.2 Let Si
0=Si for each i∈I and iteratively construct Si
n for each positive integer
n=1,2,…, by: Si
n={si∈Si
n-1 | si is not strictly dominated for player i given (Sj
n-1)j∈I}.  The game G=






  contains a single strategy for each i∈I and
we refer to the strategy profile constituted by these strategies as the strict dominance solution.
We now construct a simple counter example demonstrating that a strict dominance solution need
not be a Nash equilibrium, even if it can be achieved through a single application of strict
dominance elimination.  Let the components of the game G= {I, (Si)i∈I, (ui)i∈I} be defined as
follows.
I = {1,2},
S1 = S2 = {x | x=
1
z
 for some positive integer z}∪{0},
u1(s1,s2)= 1–s1 for each s1∈S1\{0} and each s2∈S2,
u1(0,s2)= 1 for each s2∈S2\{0},
u1(0,0)= 0,
u2(s1,s2)= 1–s2 for each s1∈S1 and each s2∈S2\{0},
u2(s1,0)=1 for each s1∈S1\{0}, and
u2(0,0)=0.
Note that u1(•,s2) is independent of s2 and strictly decreasing when constrained to the domain
S1\{0}.  Moreover, s1=0 is a better reply to s2∈S2\{0} than is any s1∈S1\{0}.  Consequently, 0 is
the only strategy in S1 that is not strictly dominated for player 1.  Indeed, s1>0 is strictly
dominated by s1´ whenever s1´<s1 and s1´≠0.  Likewise, 0 is the only strategy in S2 that is not
strictly dominated for player 2.  It follows that S1
1= S2
1={0} and the strict dominance solution is
realized after only one round of eliminating strictly dominated strategies, where S1
1 and S2
1 are as
defined in Definition 2.2.  Nonetheless, (s1, s2)=(0,0) is clearly not a Nash equilibrium in the
original game G, as can be seen by noting that u1(0,0)= 0 and u1(s1,0)= 1–s1 >0 for each
s1∈S1/{0}.
The utility functions in the example above are discontinuous at 0, suggesting that it is this
discontinuity that is responsible for results that differ from the traditional finite game context.  A
straightforward modification of the example reveals that compactness also plays a critical role.
In particular, let us reformulate strategy sets as S1=S2={x | x=n for some nonnegative integer n}.3
Furthermore, let u1(s1,s2)= 1–(1/s1) for each s1∈S1\{0} and each s2∈S2 and let u2(s1,s2)= 1–(1/s2)
for each s1∈S1 and each s2∈S2\{0}, while continuing to let u1(0,0)=u2(0,0)=0, and
u1(0,s2)=u2(s1,0)=1 for all s1∈ S1\{0} and s2∈ S2\{0}.  Utility functions in this reformulated game
are continuous under the usual Euclidean topology, while the strategy spaces now fail to be
compact.  The strategy profile (0,0) continues to be the strict dominance solution and it also
continues to fail to constitute a Nash equilibrium in the underlying game.
At this juncture it is worth further noting that the profile (s1, s2)=(0,0) would continue to be a
strict dominance solution for G even if Definition 2.1 were formulated so as to allow for
domination via mixed strategies.  Indeed, this is trivially true given that for each i=1,2, si=0 fails
to be strictly dominated for player i by any strategy, mixed or pure.
3.  Strict Dominance Nash Solutions
We conclude with a theorem establishing that strict dominance solutions must also be Nash
equilibria when consideration is restricted to games in which each player’s utility function is
continuous and each player’s strategy space is compact.  As the proof of this result does not
depend on whether or not strict domination via mixed strategies is “allowed,” we see that once
again the results we offer do not depend on our pure strategy formulation of strict domination.
Theorem 3.1 Let G= {I, (Si)i∈I, (ui)i∈I} be a game such that Si is compact and ui is continuous for
each i∈I, then a strict dominance solution of G, if one exists, must also be a Nash equilibrium.
Proof:  Let G= {I, (Si)i∈I, (ui)i∈I} be a game satisfying the theorem’s hypotheses and suppose that
there exists a strict dominance solution (si*)i∈N of G that is not a Nash equilibrium, that is, there
exists i∈I such that si* is not a best reply to s-i*.  Compactness of Si and continuity of ui thus
implies there exists si´∈Si such that ui(si´,s-i*)≥ui(si,s-i*) for all si∈Si and ui(si´,s-i*)>ui(si*,s-i*).
Note that si´≠si* and definition of strict dominance solvability implies there exists a nonnegative
integer n such that si´∈Si
n and si´∉Si
n+1, in turn implying there exists si∈Si
n such that ui(si,s-i)>
ui(si´,s-i) for all s-i∈S-i
n.  But s-i*∈S-i
n, implying that ui(si,s-i*)>ui(si´,s-i*) and thus contradicting the
assumption that ui(si´,s-i*)≥ui(si,s-i*) for all si∈Si.   QED4
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